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Abstract
This article discusses the implementation of two large-scale urban waterfront projects that are currently under construc-
tion in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) capital cities of Belgrade and Bratislava. Against the backdrop of post-
socialist urban studies and recent reflections on urban or ‘world-city’ entrepreneurialism (Golubchikov, 2010), we reveal
how both elite-serving projects are being shaped according to their very own structure and agency relations. Our compar-
ative analysis unravels the power-geometry of the decision-making processes that reshape urban planning regulations of
both transforming waterfronts. The path-dependent character of “multiple transformations” (Sykora & Bouzarovski, 2012)
in the CEE region can, even after three decades, still be traced within the institutional environments, which have been
adapting to the existing institutional architecture of global capitalism. Yet, at the same time, the dynamic globalization
of this part of the world intensifies its further attractiveness for transnational private investors. As a consequence, pub-
lic urban planning institutions are lagging behind private investors’ interests, which reshape the temporarily-fixed flows
of capital on local waterfronts into landscapes of profits, politics and power. We argue that suchlike large urban devel-
opments, focused on promoting urban growth, accelerate the dual character of these cities. Thus, while the differences
between both investigated case studies are being highlighted, we simultaneously illustrate how national and local state
actors respectively paved the way for private investors, and how this corresponds to similar overarching structural condi-
tions as well as outcomes.
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1. Introduction
Across the globe, urban waterfronts have been flourish-
ing in recent years. Their widespread, yet geographically
uneven re-emergence corresponds with the intensifying
absorption of financial flows of capital into real estate in
general, and iconic large urban developments (LUDs) in
particular. For already more than half a century, global
circuits of capital, knowledge and policies have been tem-
porarily fixed on spatially shifting urban frontiers, trans-
forming derelict post-industrial urban sites into mixed-
use luxury spaces for the new urban upper-middle class
to live, work and consume (Desfor, Laidley, Stevens, &
Schubert, 2011; Hoyle, Pinder, & Husain, 1988; Marshall,
2001). The political-economic origins behind these ur-
ban transformations are rooted in the structural crisis of
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Atlantic Fordism and the subsequent switching of capital
into urban development. Real estate and LUDs became
the key intermediary between expanding financial flows
of capital on the one hand, and extraction of the ground
rent on the other (Aalbers & Haila, 2018).
Waterfront redevelopment has become exemplary
of this new type of capital accumulation (Merrifield,
1993; Smith, 1991). It has furthermore been shown
that their emergence is facilitated through variegated
modes of entrepreneurial state-actors (Harvey, 1989;
Kipfer & Keil, 2002). One of the key justifications le-
gitimizing these urban strategies on behalf of those is
the urban growth narrative, fuelled by the alleged ne-
cessity of inter-urban competition. Thus, urban water-
fronts became the prime symbols of the changing na-
ture of urban policies, which increasingly target external
resources, on which cities seem to have become essen-
tially dependent.
While the vast majority of insights on waterfront
redevelopment and urban entrepreneurialism are still
primarily derived from studies in the Anglo-Saxon case
studies, similar geo-economic strategies are increas-
ingly being observed in cities that are currently on
the aforementioned frontiers of transnational capital
investment (Golubchikov, 2010). This includes cities in
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which are undergo-
ing dynamic post-socialist transformations.While the un-
derlying structural conditions behind these intra-urban
changes are linked to very similar principles and mecha-
nisms of contemporary capitalist urbanisation, the ways
in which such redevelopments are eventually being
implemented differ sufficiently, depending on the lo-
cal cultural and institutional context (Peck, 2015; Peck,
Theodore, & Brenner, 2013). Existing institutional lega-
cies and traditions indeed lead to different power re-
lations and decision-making practices, materialized out-
comes, and socio-economic consequences. At the same
time, however, the implementation of large-scale wa-
terfront development projects in itself generally accel-
erates institutional changes, such as regulatory experi-
ments, responsible actors, or public-private policy net-
works. It is precisely this changing institutional context,
in other words state-rescaling (Brenner, 2009), that tra-
ditionally counts as one of the central emphases within
post-socialist studies.
Post-socialism as a concept originally used to serve
as an analytical lens through which one could inter-
pret and conceptualize the fundamental political eco-
nomic and socio-spatial transformations that emerged
in CEE, immediately after the revolutionary changes in
1989. Despite the intensifying discussion on today’s rel-
evance of the concept as an analytical tool for empiri-
cal research, as well as its position within urban theory
(Ferenčuhová&Gentile, 2017; Hirt, 2013), some scholars
continue to argue in favour of the path-dependent na-
ture of post-socialism. According to them, the on-going
transformations in urban space, social practices and in-
stitutional arrangements respectively, are inextricably
linked to one another (Bouzarovski, Sykora, & Matoušek,
2017; Sykora & Bouzarovski, 2012). Rather than portray-
ing post-socialism as an overarching spatial umbrella con-
cept, it is argued that these multiple transformations
have led to locked-in and path-dependent evolutionary
trajectories of individual states.
In this article, we critically examine and compare the
similarities and differences between two large-scale wa-
terfront redevelopment projects: Sky Park in the Slovak
capital of Bratislava, and Belgrade Waterfront in the
Serbian capital of Belgrade. In particular, we aim to re-
veal how the structure-agency nexus in the decision-
making processes behind the implementation of both
projects re-shapes local planning regulations, and to
what extent processes of strategic state rescaling are con-
nected to the post-socialist context of both cities. We
specifically look more closely at the capacities of urban
planning departments to regulate and shape both LUDs
that are currently under construction. This approach is
supplementary to a number of previous studies that
were conducted on these projects, whichmainly focused
on the lack of public participation and the regulatory
and legal adjustments that were conducted (Grubbauer
& Čamprag, 2018; Lalović, Radosavljević, & Đukanović,
2015). Our comparative study allows us not only to pro-
vide deeper insights into the structure and agency dy-
namics behind contemporary LUDs but also to contribute
to on-going debates on ‘actually existing’ post-socialism.
By recognizing the distinct political-economic trajecto-
ries that Slovakia and Serbia have undergone since 1989,
we investigate to what extent the communist past still
matters in contemporary urban development practices
within their capitals. Furthermore, both cities generally
remain underrepresented cases in urban studies litera-
ture, being in the shadow of other CEE cities such as
Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw. For this reason, we be-
lieve that the insights presented in this article offer an
original and valuable contribution to the ongoing aca-
demic debates on urban transformations in CEE.
The comparative analysis draws primarily upon
carefully selected semi-structural in-depth interviews.
Interviewswere heldwith urban planning executives and
experts in both cities, alongside a variety of other direct
or indirect, public and private stakeholders. Additionally,
for both projects, we conducted qualitative analyses of
official planning documents and marketing materials,
online media research, as well as attendance of pub-
lic presentations.
We begin the theoretical part by discussing threemu-
tually intertwined themes, all being closely interlinked
to 21st-century global capitalism. Above all, we illustrate
how contemporary capital accumulation on urbanwater-
fronts in CEE is related to post-socialist state rescaling
and the formation of urban entrepreneurialism. This is
followed by the two aforementioned case studies and
the decision-making dynamics behind the implementa-
tion of both LUDs. Subsequently, we address the sim-
ilarities and differences between the two. The article
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concludes with theoretical reflections based on the pro-
cesses that we observed behind the implementation of
both waterfront-LUDs.
2. From the Collapse of ‘Equality’ to the
Entrepreneurial Spirit of ‘Inequality’
The shifting narrative of an egalitarian, socialist society
towards the animal spirit of competitive entrepreneuri-
alism is being formed and domesticated in a variety of
ways across the CEE region. After the implosion of the
communist regime in 1989, individual countries under-
went variegated trajectories on their return to capitalism.
Liberalization of markets, deregulation of prices, priva-
tization of public assets, and decentralization of power
were only a few of the key measures that have triggered
today’s neoliberalization of the urban landscape within
CEE. The post-socialist transition, thus consisting ofmulti-
ple transformations (Sykora & Bouzarovski, 2012), can be
put into parallel with what Brenner and Theodore (2002)
called “institutional creative destruction.”
Whereas the initial destructive forces in most cases
dismantled the state’s monopoly power and its institu-
tional arrangements, the ‘creative moment’ of estab-
lishing new rules of the game alongside the political-
economic integration into new centres of power,
opened up new “spaces of engagement” (Cox, 1998).
Deregulation and the dismantlement of the state in ur-
ban development contributed to the victory of an ex-
change over use-value, and therefore to losses of indus-
trial heritage, real estate speculations, but also to an in-
crease of socio-spatial inequalities. This era of ‘roll back’
neoliberalism fuelled the rise of antagonism among local
citizens due to the lack of responsibility and transparency
of municipalities in urban development in CEE (Peck &
Tickell, 2002).
Yet, this initial phase of post-socialist ‘roll back’ ne-
oliberalism has become a fertile ground for a second
phase of the creative moment, namely ‘roll out’ ne-
oliberalism (Peck & Tickell, 2002). This conceptual pro-
cess, which has been widely observed across the North
Atlantic during the early 1990s, is mainly characterised
by entrepreneurial state leadership, new forms of gover-
nance, and the reform of regulations. One important pre-
condition for such novel institutional arrangements is the
emergence of the entrepreneurial city narrative (Jessop,
1998) which is currently increasingly embraced by politi-
cal elites and policy makers throughout CEE. It is impor-
tant to note here, however, that the exact transition be-
tween these two moments has a strong path dependent
character, which justifies the lasting interests of scholars
in actually existing post-socialism up until today.
The revolutionary changes that occurred in CEE from
the late 1980s onwards indeed triggered essential scalar
reconfigurations, so state-rescaling became a political
strategy (Brenner, 2009). Similar to the hollowing out of
the nation-state after the crisis of Atlantic Fordism in the
advanced capitalist countries (Jessop, 2000), the transfer
of power in the majority of CEE countries, especially the
ones entering the EU, went in both directions, upward
and downward. This twin process is known as “glocaliza-
tion” (Swyngedouw, 2004), and refers to the institutional
restructuring from the national to a supranational and
global scale, as well as to local, urban and regional scales,
but also to the strategies of global inter-firmnetworks for
their regional embeddedness. An important symptom of
these structural changes of capitalism following the sec-
ular crisis in the 1970s, were changes in the nature of
how cities were governed, resulting in place increasingly
becoming an entrepreneurial asset (Harvey, 1989; Logan
& Molotch, 2007). In order to obtain higher positions
on several rankings of the inter-urban world hierarchies,
cities have become increasingly competitive in attracting
mobile resources through place branding strategies and
thus becamemore commodified in themselves. Scholars
have labelled these strategies enforced by cities with dif-
ferent terms such as “policy boosterism,” adopting city-
marketing and urban planning practices to globally cir-
culating ‘best-practices’ (McCann, 2013); or “glurbanisa-
tion,” which refers to place-based strategies specifying
the glocal relations and searching for the niche in inter-
scalar divisions of labour in the world economy (Jessop
& Sum, 2000).
Based on all the above, it is important to realise that
urban waterfronts have become not only passive recip-
ients of the switching and fixing of capital, i.e., ‘spatial-
fix’ (Harvey, 2001; Merrifield, 1993), but increasingly
outcomes of neoliberal urban planning, and active en-
trepreneurial strategies on behalf of local governments
(Hall & Hubbard, 1996; Jessop, 1997; Kipfer & Keil, 2002).
They are, in other words, the frontiers where the cap-
italist and territorial logics of power meet each other
(Harvey, 2005; Jessop, 2006). This distinction allows us
to separate the growth logics from entrepreneurial prac-
tices, as two parallel forces behind contemporary urban
development (Lauermann, 2018).
Three decades since the collapse of communism is a
sufficient time period for a qualitative evaluation of the
relationship between the real estate industry and urban
planning. In particular, which logics did urban planning
adopt, and which trends can be traced in the changing
relations between urban planners, politicians, and the
real estate sector? Scholars interested in post-1989 ur-
ban development in CEE extensively discussed the lack
of transparency in urban planning, the speculative busi-
ness culture, and broadly speaking the ‘socialisation of
risks and privatization of benefits’ which made property
developers and private investors the winners of the tran-
sition (e.g., Brabec & Machala, 2015; Cook, 2010; Horak,
2014; Suska, 2015). The role of local governance was,
during the ‘roll back’ phase of the transition, associated
with terms such as ad-hoc, fuzzy, or acting in a “fire-
fighter style” (Feldman, 2000). However, a gradual insti-
tutional consolidation and adaptation to territorial plan-
ning based on the competition between multiple actors
over space has steadily, at least in more advanced CEE
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countries, led to rather standard forms of public-private
cooperation and approaches to urban planning. Today’s
formation of the entrepreneurial narrative frequently
overemphasizes the role of the built environment in de-
livering socio-economic growth and prosperity. This en-
trepreneurial strategy, known as property-led develop-
ment, fuels the integration of growth logics, driven by
real estate actors, into urban planning practices (Heeg,
2011). Such approaches are enforcing the built environ-
ment as a policy tool, however, it often narrows the fo-
cus down to aesthetic aspects. It is in this context that
we introduce the emergence of, as well as the decision-
making dynamics behind the formation of two water-
front LUDs in Belgrade and Bratislava.
3. A Regulatory Captured Waterfront in Bratislava:
Introducing Zaha Hadid
The fall of the Iron Curtain opened a new historically
important chapter for Slovakia. Even among the rapidly
transforming CEE countries, its trajectory is particularly
dynamic. The democratization of society accompanied
by the decentralization of power, the transition to capi-
talism, the formation of the sovereign state with the cap-
ital city of Bratislava, EU membership, and the change
between three currencies with the Euro being the last;
all these events were compressed into two decades af-
ter 1989 and triggered fundamental spatial and socio-
economic changes. Moreover, these were even accel-
erated by neoliberal measures put forward between
2002 and 2006 by the right-wing government, especially
by the Minister of Finance Ivan Mikloš, which boosted
the economy alongside rising inequalities within the
country. The Slovak capital has been benefitting from
the uneven geographical development within the coun-
try by its rapid, though unsustainable, urban growth.
The trap of the mushrooming suburban ring in the
metropolitan region of the city has occurred simultane-
ously with dynamic intra-urban transformations (Sveda
& Suska, 2019).
The contemporary waterfront re-development in
Bratislava is driven by multiple project-centric and profit-
maximizing interests of primarily domestic real estate de-
velopers. The waterfront has become a matter of pres-
tige and symbolic power for local real estate develop-
ers, related to their position on the domestic property
market, as well as the key urban frontier of profit max-
imization (see also Machala, 2014). As one of the inter-
viewed executive managers mentioned: “Our presence
among powerful players at the centre of the capital grav-
ity is a necessity.” The relationship between the interests
of the real estate industry and urban planning regula-
tors is especially poignant when it comes to the decision-
making processes behind LUDs that have been emerg-
ing on the waterfront since the beginning of the new
millennium. One of the most recent ones is the flashy
Sky Park project, designed by Zaha Hadid Architects and
developed by Penta Real Estate. The mobilizing narra-
tive behind the project searches for parallels with the
Guggenheim museum in Bilbao. The Sky Park aims to
become a new symbol of the city that attracts visitors
and increases revenues of the city. However, as it will
be shown, and contrary to the strong public alliance that
stood behind the Guggenheim museum, the Sky Park is
a project-centric initiative driven by a single real estate
developer without any comprehensive strategy. Similar
to other large-scale waterfront projects in Bratislava, this
case reveals how the key decisions of public regulators
were systemically developer-friendly. The evidence is il-
lustrative for the on-going property-led waterfront re-
development in Bratislava.
Unlike Copenhagen (Desfor & Jorgensen, 2004),
Toronto (Laidley, 2007), or Hamburg (Schubert, 2011),
the transforming urban waterfront in Bratislava is not
led by any particular place-based strategy or public de-
velopment agency. The strategic plan of the city itself
has a questionable role in urban development. The ex-
ecutive manager of a large real estate developer active
also in Bratislava expressed his experience with the fol-
lowing words:
I haven’t really seen the strategic plan and I don’t even
know about this document. What we care about is
the city land use plan and transport documentation—
that’s it. The strategic plan of the city is only a pa-
per and the municipality does not foster any partic-
ular strategy in our negotiations. No-one really cares
about strategic documents of the city, they are really
something virtual.
Nevertheless, the narrative of the city’s land use plan
aims to reinforce the position of the city as “the new
European metropolis on the Danube” (City of Bratislava,
2007, p. 5, part C), and the waterfront is a vital part
of such planning regulation. Both city and regional-level
planning documents highlight the representative func-
tions of the waterfront, its high scenic value, above-
regional importance, and the opportunity for extending
the city centre. In particular, their land-use plans favour
a concentration of congress centers, high-rise buildings,
and headquarters of public institutions aswell as transna-
tional corporations on the waterfront. All things con-
sidered, urban planning regulations boost scenic and
panoramic aspects of the waterfront through the em-
phasis on quality architecture, functions of high added
value, and placement of the key institutions. As a con-
sequence, the currently emerging entrepreneurial nar-
rative, which overemphasizes the role of the built envi-
ronment in delivering prosperity, is underpinned by the
above-summarized framing of the city’s land use plan.
The origins of the narrative introduced here can be
traced back to 2008 when the Old City district initiated
a zonal regulation for a roughly 22ha largely abandoned
area known as the Chalupkova locality. The underlying
urbanistic study, a planning document which formally
precedes the elaboration of a zonal plan, had two key
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ideas. First, an extension of mixed-use functions in this
formerly industrial zone. Second, due to contaminated
soil in the area (an environmental legacy of an aerial
bombing of the Apollo refinery during World War II), the
study suggested a conditional development. This meant
a flexibilization of regulations (higher maximal indexes)
in exchange for the decontamination of the soil. The com-
pleted study was delivered by the external author to the
urban planning department of the city in 2008 and was
supposed to serve as an underlying document for an up-
date of the city’s land use plan, as well as the compilation
of the new zonal plan. However, it took twice as much
time than it usually takes to finish the zonal plan, so only
after 10 years, in 2018, it finally becamea legal document
(see Figure 1). During this period, Sky Park obtained all
necessary permissions, so at the moment the zonal plan
was launched, all had already been set.
In parallel to the compilation of the planning docu-
ments, the real estate developer organized an open pri-
vate architectonic competition for the site between 2008
and 2010. The competition attracted someof the interna-
tionally well-known architectonic ateliers. The winning
proposal, designed by Zaha Hadid architects, suggested
amorphous solitaire towers for the site (see Figure 2).
However, these became a central issue within negotia-
tions between the investor and the urban planners, as
the city’s land use plan favoured here compact blocks
of houses. This mismatch was raised by several urban
planners, who openly questioned whether the final pro-
posal is in line with the city’s land use plan. They also
admitted that the architect’s celebrity reputation partly
served as a powerful tool in the decision-making pro-
cess. The role of urban planners has, according to some
respondents, shifted from planners to lawyers due to
Figure 1. From left to right: The urbanistic study 2008; the approved zonal plan 2018. Source: The Old Town City District
(2018).
Figure 2. Visualisation of the Sky Park project. Source: Penta Investments (n.d.).
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asymmetric power relations behind the negotiations ta-
ble. In other words, the profession has been reduced to a
more legal, technical interpretation of the land use plan.
Interviewed planners in non-executive positions of the
city and city district who attended these negotiations
respectively admitted that, “in the case of large-scale
projects it’s like machinery and we are in the position of
figurants.” Furthermore:
The negotiating power has, in production and enforce-
ment of large urban projects, a critical role. The pres-
sure of the powerful in negotiations accompanied by
lawyers is often enormous….The degree of our influ-
ence in communication reflects or depends on the
strictness of investors interests.
These statements offer important insights into the atmo-
sphere of these negotiations and at the same time create
a context in which the land-use regulation is re-shaped.
The eventual implementation of the Sky Park project
is the result of multi-scalar power dynamics, built upon
a series of developer-friendly decisions taken by the key
decision-making regulators. First, the integration of the
urbanistic study into the land use plan, led by the plan-
ning department of the city, was a highly selective pro-
cess. According to the authors of the study, two impor-
tant regulatory conditions were removed: (1) an upper
limit for building heights, and (2) a buffer zone (30m)
from a neighbouring electric transformer. Second, de-
spite the fact that the city department of urban plan-
ning removed these conditions, and therefore softened
the planning regulation, the city district could integrate
them into the zonal plan (the zonal regulation is in the
competence of city districts). Indeed, in 2012 the com-
pleted zonal planwas sent to the district authority, which
is obliged to issue an official position to the legal and for-
mal status of the zonal planwithin 30 days. This is the last
procedural step before the city district’s parliament can
officially authorize the zonal plan. However, the district
authority did not act within the legally bounded period,
and thus paralyzed the zonal plan between 2012 and
2015. Several respondents, independently from each
other, blamed the real estate developer for being in the
background of the district authority’s inaction. Third, af-
ter the communal elections in 2014, the city department
of urban planning and the newly elected mayor issued
mandatory permissions for Sky Park between 2015 and
2016. Once a construction obtains such legal permission,
it is mandatory for the city district to integrate them
into the planning documentation. As the zonal regulation
was not approved at that moment, the city district was
obliged to do so. Thus, by issuing the mandatory permis-
sions for Sky Park, the city secured the integration of the
project into an already completed zonal plan, thereby tor-
pedoing the efforts of the city district.
All in all, unravelling the role of individual scales be-
hind the implementation of the Sky Park project illus-
trates how systemic the nature of the developer-friendly
decisions in the decisive moments really is. The city took
the leading role in its materialization. It actively paved
the path for the implementation of the Sky Park by a se-
lective integration of the urbanistic study into the city
land use plan, and by issuing the mandatory permissions
it avoided the Old town city district. Thus the planning
procedures, as well as the multi-scalar power dynamics,
turned out to be highly favourable to facilitating the large
scale project, which contributes to the maximization of
the project-centric vision and ultimately the duality of
the city. Finally, after 10 years, the Old town city district
approved the Chalupkova zonal plan in February 2018,
but it had zero effect on the Sky Park project
4. Belgrade Waterfront: Where Authoritarianism and
Entrepreneurialism Meet
The idea of developing a large scale, mixed-use
Waterfront area in Belgrade was first announced in 2012
by Serbia’s current president Aleksandar Vučić. Back
then, he was taking part in the elections in order to
become the city’s mayor. Despite his promises to bring
an investor from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that
was willing to help the city forward by developing an
eye-catching real estate project on the city’s centrally-
located but derelict Sava amphitheatre site, he did not
become mayor that year. Soon after, however, Vučić
did manage to rapidly pursue a successful political ca-
reer by consecutively obtaining the positions of deputy
prime minister, prime minister and eventually president.
In the meantime, his political party (SNS) managed to
gain an absolute majority on both the state and the local
level. In this capacity, Vučić and his closest political allies
have been able to appropriate the implementation of
the project to a large extent, in collaboration with the
Abu Dhabi-based transnational developer Eagle Hills.
Prior to providing more empirical details on the im-
plementation strategies, institutional adjustments and
the scalar power relations behind Belgrade Waterfront,
it is important to note that the post-socialist trajectory
that Serbia went through in the past three decades sig-
nificantly differs from most other CEE countries. While
the Yugoslav model of socialism already contained many
differences as compared to other CEE states in the pre-
1989 period, the tumultuous 1990s in Serbiaweremainly
characterised by war, state disintegration and interna-
tional isolation. Hence, capitalism and democracy were
to a lesser extent embraced. Instead, the former nomen-
klaturamembers for many years succeeded in maintain-
ing their system of interlocking positions in the domi-
nant political and economic spheres (Lazić, 2015). This is
one of the reasons why land in Serbia, contrary to many
other CEE countries, has remained state-owned (Hirt,
2013): an arrangement that dates back from a law that
was signed in 1995. Although from the early 21st cen-
tury onwards state monopoly over urban development
was gradually to be replaced through processes of de-
centralization, privatization and entrepreneurialism (City
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of Belgrade, 2003; Nedović-Budić, Zeković, & Vujosević,
2012), the state ownership of urban land designated for
construction has as yet been untouched. This particu-
lar post-socialist legacy is not only an important back-
bone of power for the political elite, but it also provides
exactly the institutional context that made Belgrade
such an attractive destination for transnational real es-
tate developers.
The eventual arrival of the foreign Belgrade
Waterfront developer in 2014 did not go unnoticed. The
promise of a 3.5 billion-dollar investment soon led to
a lot of speculation and conspiracy theories amongst
citizens and fierce opponents of the plan such as op-
position politicians and excluded domestic architects.
In the Belgrade Waterfront brochure that was soon re-
leased, Eagle Hills describes itself as a company that
“develops flagship city destinations that invigorate aspir-
ing nations, [h]elping countries raise their global profiles
to new heights” (Eagle Hills, n.d., p. 8). Their chairman,
Mohamed Alabbar, is a well-known real estate business-
man from Dubai who possesses close ties to the UAE’s
rulers (Buckley & Hanieh, 2014). In his capacity as chair-
man of Emaar Properties, another state-related devel-
oper, he has a lot of experience when it comes to LUDs
in the UAE itself. This is important to note since the way
in which Belgrade Waterfront is being implemented in
terms of urban design (see Figure 3)marketing strategies
(see Figure 4), as well as decision-making, is very reminis-
cent of how real estate development usually takes place
in Dubai (see Acuto, 2010; Koelemaij, 2019). In order to
allow this development to actually happen, the Serbian
political elite facilitated a number of widely-contested
institutional adjustments.
First of all, the fact that Eagle Hills suddenly arrived
with an instant urban design for the Sava amphitheatre
was, according to many opponents of the plan, conflict-
ing with existing planning documents on behalf of the
City Assembly, which required a public tendering pro-
cess for an architectural competition. Secondly, civil ser-
vants from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade, who
had been for a few years responsible for developing ur-
ban master plans, admitted in an interview that the new
planning document that included, and thus ‘legalized’
the Belgrade Waterfront project, came on behalf of the
Republic Agency for Spatial Planning:
The government of Serbia has made a decision to de-
clare this part of the city an area of great significance.
Basically, this kind of plan goes under the jurisdiction
of the Republic. Not the city. The city has the mas-
ter plan, and detailed urban plans: This is the main
division of the plans in the city, but this special spa-
tial plan [of “national importance”] is something that
goes under the jurisdiction of the Republic. (See also
Republic of Serbia, 2014)
Subsequently, in early 2015, a Lex Specialis was in-
troduced (Republic of Serbia, 2015), which specifically
served to facilitate Belgrade Waterfront’s development
by issuing the building permit to start the construction
while overruling existing laws regarding building condi-
tions, such as the maximum allowed height of a building.
At the same time, the Republic of Serbia and Eagle
Hills signed a joint venture agreement through which
they established the Belgrade Waterfront Company.
According to this contract, which was revealed to the
Figure 3. The ‘instant design’ of Belgrade Waterfront as presented within the original brochure. Source: Eagle Hills (n.d.).
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Figure 4. A billboard close to the construction site, advertising the project. Photograph by the authors.
public several months later after on-going demand for
more transparency regarding the project, Eagle Hills
largely provides the financial ‘inputs’ along with dic-
tating the urban design as well as the marketing and
sales strategies, while the Serbian state was required
to enable any means necessary for implementing the
project. Decontaminating the soil and preparing the ba-
sic infrastructural utilities on the construction site are ex-
amples of the latter, alongside the aforementioned in-
stitutional and regulatory adjustments. Additionally, it
appeared from the contract that the investor is leas-
ing the nearly 80 hectares of land for a period of 99
years (Belgrade Waterfront Company, 2015; Grubbauer
& Čamprag, 2018).
What started as a personal prestige project of con-
temporary president Aleksander Vučić soon resulted in a
dynamic network of actors representing different scalar
levels and institutional arrangements. While Eagle Hills
exclusively co-operates with international partners for
designing the project, the Serbian government arranges
local construction firms. At the same time, responsi-
ble state actors are somewhat ambivalent about their
level of interaction with the Eagle Hills head office in
Abu Dhabi. This was mainly illustrated by the Mayor’s
Office Chief of Staff, interviewed in 2016, who simultane-
ously represents the Serbian government at the Belgrade
Waterfront Company shareholders meeting, a position
he obtained thanks to his close relationship with then
mayor Siniša Mali, in turn a close political ally of Vučić.
Besides acting as if the Serbian government, or in other
words him, Mali and a number of others, were com-
pletely in control of everything, he was also willing to
admit that some implementation practices were forced
upon them ‘from above’ as well. One example hereof is
the aggressive marketing campaign of the project across
public spaces throughout the city, something which they
knew would be disapproved of by many citizens, but still
got pushed through by those withmore decision-making
power: “We are not dealing with that [advertising cam-
paign], it’s an investor-story you know...they provide the
finance and they’re taking care of the project, because
that’s something that they do best, you know. We can-
not do that.”
The local managers from the Belgrade-based Eagle
Hills office (which later merged into the Belgrade
Waterfront Company), interviewed in 2015, generally
applied very similar justifying rhetoric as the Mayor’s
Office Chief of Staff. Interestingly though, they admit-
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ted that they were “positively surprised” by the amount
of freedom that the Serbian government had provided
themwith. According to them, said the Head of Business
Development and Sales: “They are willing to make our
job easier, to an extent we usually do not get.” They fur-
thermore argued that changes in the law were actually
a necessity since the current investor climate in Serbia is
not suitable for the fast-changing international property
market. Hence, they kept emphasizing the importance of
“speeding up processes, otherwise, it will never work.”
They saw it as their biggest challenge to “change the
mindset of the [Serbian] people,” which they believed
was a lot more difficult than constructing the real estate,
even though the “client psychology works the same ev-
erywhere.” This is why, besides targeting the Serbian di-
aspora as potential buyers and sharing optimistic num-
bers regarding their levels of pre-sales, they were also
actively involved in strategies related to improving the
public discourse on the project. At the same time, how-
ever, they also indicated that they were often receiving
direct instructions from theAbuDhabi-based headoffice,
which again indicates the ‘scalar hierarchies’ underlying
the Belgrade Waterfront project.
Within the scope of this article, there are a number
of features regarding Belgrade Waterfront that are par-
ticularly relevant to highlight. It has been illustrated how
local urban planning civil servants are largely excluded
from the planning process, while previous plans are
being overruled by newly established ‘special purpose’
plans that come along with legal and institutional adjust-
ments. These are being justified by the investor and the
responsible government actors alike by emphasizing the
inevitable need to adapt to the rules of the game of con-
temporary global capitalism. Furthermore, Serbia’s par-
ticular post-socialist legacy, which is characterised by still
very powerful central state institutions which also pos-
sess much of the land, has allowed Belgrade Waterfront
to be implemented inways that echo authoritarian, spec-
ulative capital-driven real estate development practices
within the UAE itself. While several scholars have ad-
dressed the severe dual city realities that exist in the UAE
(e.g., Acuto, 2010), many critical voices in Belgrade have
raised their concerns about the alleged mismatch be-
tween the elite-driven Belgrade Waterfront project and
the average purchasing power within the city. Besides,
Stanković (2016) highlights the forced displacement of a
number of residents from the future construction site,
while creative entrepreneurs in the adjacent area of
Savamala feel threatened by the project’s future spatial
claims (Wright, 2015). In other words, one could indeed
argue that the project will contribute, and is already con-
tributing to urban dualities.
5. The Comparative Reflection
The urban waterfronts in both capitals are undergoing
significant changes. At first glance, Bratislava’s Sky Park
and Belgrade Waterfront are being shaped by fairly sim-
ilar processes. Not only do they overlap in terms of at-
tracting a lot of external attention as mixed-use and
eye-catching architectural LUDs that materialize capital
flows and of eye-catching architecture, which are sup-
posed to up-scale the cities’ global profiles (Golubchikov,
2010). They also contribute to the formation of the en-
trepreneurial narrative, backed by a property-led devel-
opment and thus the emphasis on the role of the built
environment in delivering future prosperity (Heeg, 2011).
Alongside these similar features, however, there are a
number of cardinal differences regarding the implemen-
tation of both projects, as a result of the local context
they are situated within.
Waterfront redevelopment in Bratislava is an exam-
ple of ‘naturally’ market-driven transformation, formed
into multiple LUDs, and led primarily by domestic real
estate developers. The entrepreneurial narrative, em-
phasizing the quality development of the built environ-
ment, is currently being intensified and is based on a se-
lective and technical interpretation of the city land use
plan. The entrepreneurial vision of Sky Park is driven
by a single real estate developer which increases vul-
nerabilities regarding its potential failure (Doucet, 2013),
and ultimately contributes to the production of dual
socio-economic realities within the city. The multi-scalar
power dynamics behind its implementation can be ob-
served between the state (the city district authority
which acts as construction authority), the city (the de-
partment of urban planning and the mayor), and the
city district (the department of urban planning and the
Districts’ mayor) scales respectively. The urban scale
turns out to be the key vehicle delivering the project, al-
though the state actor plays an important role by paralyz-
ing the city district as well. The case study indicates that
in Bratislava, ties between public and private actors are
characterized by systemic developer-friendly decisions
on multiple scales.
Belgrade Waterfront, on the other hand, is a strong
top-down political strategy of a single LUD. Here, al-
lied politicians and public institutions are actively in-
volved through legal (a Lex Specialis) and institutional
(the Belgrade Waterfront Company) instruments. The
state scale is the key vehicle for delivering the project,
alongside the UAE-based transnational developer. The
project is significantly different from Sky Park in this re-
gard. It has been legitimized as being of national impor-
tance (see also Čamprag, 2019), and through personal re-
lations between the political elite and the transnational
capital, it forms a multi-scalar growth coalition (Logan
& Molotch, 2007). This particular power geometry is
only possible due to the deviant post-socialist context
of Serbia.
Despite the above-mentioned differences, the fun-
damentally uneven power-relations between real estate
developers and urban planning regulation is strikingly
similar in both cities. In both cases, regulators have sys-
tematically adjusted regulations in favour of the project-
oriented interests of these LUDs.
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6. Conclusion
This article has, first of all, illustrated that it is currently
not rare to find cases of ambitious LUDs within CEE. We
argue that whereas there is not an explicit growth nar-
rative per se, urban planning is increasingly forced to be
driven by rent-seeking interests of the real estate indus-
try, justified by the entrepreneurial narrative of property-
led development. The way these projects are being im-
plemented, however, can differ significantly. These dif-
ferences are still largely caused by inherited institutional
practices from the past, or in other words the particular
post-socialist trajectories that countries have taken.
Slovakia has undergone a historically dynamic trajec-
tory during the last three decades. Alongside obtaining
independence, the post-socialist transition followed the
‘shock therapy’ recipe, which was accompanied by the
decentralization of responsibilities and competences to
lower scales of government. Thus, widely-assumed pro-
cesses of glocalisation indeed occurred, partly as a re-
sult of joining the European Union. In other words, the
inter-related processes of state-rescaling and urban en-
trepreneurialism are to a large extent reminiscent of ex-
amples from the Anglo-Saxon context: local governments
have become the dominant actors that are increasingly
facilitating growth-oriented, property-led developments
such as Sky Park. Since Serbia’s trajectory has been more
chaotic, and generally more ‘deviant’ as compared to
other CEE-countries, national-level state actors still have
relatively much decision-making power, and thus local
state actors are actually easily bypassed and overruled.
In both cities, one can observe how urban planning prac-
tices have recently become dominated and dictated by
logics relating to capital accumulation and a specula-
tive form of world city entrepreneurialism (Golubchikov,
2010). However, since the associated state-rescaling dy-
namics are so different, this happens somewhat more
subtle in Bratislava, while in Belgrade the way in which
the project is being implemented is more authoritarian.
Structural drivers, related to globally circulating cap-
ital, policies and ideologies, are clearly present across
cities in CEE. Once they touch the ground, however, they
become ‘real,’ and differences start to emerge. These dif-
ferences are caused not only by the important role of
agency, as both our case studies also revealed, but also
by the inherited, path-dependent institutional context.
This article thus contributes to on-going debates on the
applicability of structural, universal theories such as ‘ac-
tually existing’ neoliberal urbanism, as well as of over-
arching spatial concepts such as post-socialism. We ar-
gue that the latter can still be useful as a lens through
which one could look at contemporary urban transforma-
tionswithin CEE since it allows you to grasp the structure-
agency nexus. On the other hand, however, one should
be careful not to take CEE for granted as a geographic
region, since our research has proven that trajectories
of individual countries within the region can be signifi-
cantly different.
Urban entrepreneurialism has been observed across
the North-Atlantic from the 1980s onwards. The con-
temporary entrepreneurial strategies in Bratislava and
Belgrade are not innovative, but rather imitate property-
led development from elsewhere. Many critical schol-
ars, besides Harvey (1989) or Mollenkopf and Castells
(1991), warn us that these tend to contribute to increas-
ing dualities, which means that instead of the popular
trickle-down growth-narrative, social and spatial inequal-
ities may subsequently increase. Further research on
this topic should, therefore, deal with the exact socio-
spatial consequences of newly established Waterfront-
LUDs across the CEE once they are finished within the
upcoming years.
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